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Abstract 
Hannah Arendt based her political philosophy upon Kant's theory of aesthetic 
judgment rather than his political or moral philosophies. Arendt argued that the social 
nature of Kant's theory of aesthetic judgment was absent from his moral philosophy. For 
Arendt, sociability was the quintessential characteristic of human nature. Consequently, 
Arendt argued that political judgments were accomplished by representing others' 
perspectives through the faculty of imagination, a process that she described (following 
Kant) as enlarging one's mentality. Counter-intuitively, Arendt maintained that enlarged 
mentality was not empathy. 
In this thesis, rather than focusing on Arendt's theory of political judgment, I 
focus on the phenomenological underpinnings underlying Arendt's notion of enlarged 
mentality and argue that enlarged mentality in fact depends upon a form of empathy that 
stems from embodiment phenomenology, i.e., the work of phenomenologists such as 
Edmund Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Edith Stein. I hypothesize that if Arendt were privy 
to this more elaborate definition of empathy, Arendt would have agreed that enlarged 
mentality depends upon this form of empathy that I will develop in this thesis. 
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Chapter One 
1.0 Introduction 
According to Hannah Arendt, when we make political judgments we do so by 
taking the judgments of others into account: "I form an opinion by considering a given 
issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those 
who are absent; that is I represent them" ("Truth and Politics" 241 ). Yet, Arendt denies 
that this procedure is empathy ("Truth and Politics" 241 ). Arendt may deny that enlarged 
mentality is a form of empathy because she does not want to confuse the cognitive 
structures of empathy with the operation of the faculty of the imagination in occurrent 
acts of empathy. While the ontological conditions of empathy are also necessary 
ontological conditions of enlarged mentality, they do not provide sufficient conditions 
for the achievement of enlarged thinking. 1 Nevertheless, contemporary theorists, such as 
George Kateb, question the relationship between empathy and enlarged mentality in 
Arendt. Unlike Arendt, Kateb says that," ... empathy helps further to enlarge enlarged 
mentality" (135). Like Kateb, I also believe the relationship between empathy and 
enlarged mentality is more complex than Arendt had originally conceived. In order to 
demonstrate this connection, I will develop a theory of human subjectivity based upon 
embodiment phenomenology's conception of empathy. 
In this thesis I will explore the phenomenological underpinnings of Arendt's 
theory of enlarged mentality, and argue that in fact enlarged mentality relies upon a 
certain form of empathy. In the first chapter of the thesis, I discuss the key concepts of 
Arendt's theory: sensus communis, enlarged mentality, actor/spectator, impartiality, and 
going visiting. For the most part, Arendt uses these concepts in order to develop a 
1 I must thank Walter Okshevsky for this observation. 
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political philosophy based on Kant's theory of aesthetic judgment, which Arendt 
describes as Kant's "unwritten" political philosophy. In order to understand the basis of 
Arendt's fundamental concepts for a political philosophy, I devote attention in this 
chapter to explaining how she conceived of Kant's theory of aesthetic judgment. 
The second chapter outlines the theory of empathy that I will later argue is 
essential to Arendt's concept of enlarged mentality. This theory of empathy has its roots 
in phenomenology, specifically embodiment phenomenology, which is the position of 
such philosophers as Edmund Husserl, Edith Stein, and Merleau-Ponty, as well as 
contemporary embodiment phenomenologists such as James Mensch, Dan Zahavi, and 
Evan Thompson. 
In the third chapter I demonstrate that the key concepts of Arendt's theory of 
enlarged mentality rely upon embodied phenomenology, and in turn, that enlarged 
mentality relies upon the more elaborate theory of empathy that I describe in my second 
chapter. 
1.1 Arendt on Kant's Aesthetic Judgment: a Note on Translation 
In attempting to understand Arendt's theory of political judgment, it is important 
that we appreciate Arendt's understanding of Kant's theory of aesthetic judgment rather 
than simply focusing on the task of grasping Kant's theory of aesthetic judgment in itself. 
There are a number of Arendt commentators (e.g., Seyla Benhabib, Ronald Beiner, 
Richard Bernstein, and George Kateb) who point to the controversial nature of Arendt's 
interpretation of Kant's work, especially on Kant's "unwritten" political philosophy. The 
majority of commentators believe that Kant's political philosophy, along with his moral 
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philosophy, is based upon practical reason, not judgment. For example, according to 
Richard Bernstein, "Arendt well knew that, even though she invokes the name of Kant, 
she was radically departing from Kant" (232). In addition, according to Maurizio 
d'Entreves, 
... Arendt based her theory of political judgment on Kant's aesthetics 
rather than on his moral philosophy. At first this might seem a puzzling 
choice, since Kant himself based his moral and political philosophy on 
practical reason and not on our aesthetic faculties (112). 
However, it is not my purpose in this paper to question Arendt's interpretation of 
Kant's work. In this thesis, I want to focus upon the substance of the views regarding 
political judgment that Arendt developed from her interpretation of Kant's theory of 
aesthetic judgment, while acknowledging that controversy exists over the accuracy of that 
interpretation. Nevertheless, Arendt takes Kant's theory of aesthetic judgments to be his 
"unwritten" political philosophy. 
According to Arendt, what is characteristic of politics is the plurality of opinions 
among actors. It is here that one finds the quintessential reason why Arendt believed 
Kant's "unwritten" political philosophy is in his third critique, The Critique of Judgment 
and not in his moral philosophy. According to Arendt, 
The most decisive difference between the Critique of Practical Reason 
and the Critique of Judgment is that the moral laws of the former are valid 
for all intelligible beings, whereas the rules of the latter are strictly limited 
in their validity to human beings on earth (Lectures 13). 
What Arendt means by this statement is that Kant's moral philosophy, which is 
represented by the Critique of Practical Reason, can be discovered by individuals 
through the faculty of practical reason. For example, according to Kant, in a moral matter 
one can discover the correct moral response through one's faculty of reason 
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independently of others. If the person is correct in his or her reasoning and he or she 
abided by the Categorical Imperative, then this person does not have to consult others for 
validation of decisions in moral matters (Kant Morals). 
On the other hand, matters of judgment do not follow a strict rule-based process. 
According to Arendt, 
... the first part of the Critique of Judgment deals with objects of judgment 
properly speaking, such as an object that we call "beautiful" without being 
able to subsume it under a general category of Beauty as such; we have no 
rule that could be applied. (If you say, "What a beautiful rose!" you do not 
arrive at this judgment by first saying, "All roses are beautiful, this flower 
is a rose, hence this rose is beautiful." Or conversely, "Beauty is roses, this 
flower is a rose, hence, it is beautiful") (Lectures 13-14). 
Arendt develops this further when she says, 
For judgment of the particular- This is beautiful, This is ugly; This is 
right, This is wrong- has no place in Kant's moral philosophy. Judgment 
is not practical reason; practical reason 'reasons' and tells me what to do 
and what not to do; it lays down the law and is identical with the will, and 
the will utters commands; it speaks in imperatives. Judgment, on the 
contrary, arises from "a merely contemplative pleasure or inactive 
delight." This "feeling of contemplative pleasure is called taste," and the 
Critique of Judgment was originally called Critique of Taste (Lectures 15). 
However, although aesthetic judgments are not made through a rigid rule based 
procedure, it does not necessarily follow that aesthetic judgments are purely subjective. 
For example, if we return to Arendt's example of the beautiful rose, when we say "What 
a beautiful rose," we do not mean to say solely that "This is a beautiful rose to me," 
implying that it is only beautiful to me and it 'might' be beautiful to you as well. Instead, 
when we say "What a beautiful rose," we are making a universal claim insofar as we 
assert that this rose is not only beautiful to the individual, but for all others who view it as 
well. 
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It is here, with the 'common sense', that judgments have their social character. I 
will first explore Arendt's notion of common sense derived from the Latin term, sensus 
communis, and then I will explore what follows from our sensus communis, namely, 
enlarged mentality. 
1.2 Sensus Communis 
Common sense, or sensus communis, is a technical term Arendt borrows from 
Kant. It is not to be confused with the everyday usage of the term common sense, which 
generally refers to a characteristic such as practicality, level-headedness, and so on. 
Rather, Kant and Arendt use the term in its Latin etymology, namely, sensus communis. 
In its Latin form, sensus can be roughly translated as "sense, sensation; feeling, attitude; 
judgment, perception, understanding; sense, meaning of words, etc.; a sentence" 
(Wheelock 131 ). Communis can be translated as 
... shared, common, universal, public; 'loca', public places; 'loci', 
commonplaces; of persons, approachable, affable. N. as subst. commune, 
common property, esp. in plur.; state, commonwealth; 'in commune', for 
the public good, also in general. Adv. communiter, jointly, generally 
(Wheelock 131 ). 
For the purpose of this paper, I suggest that instead of referring to sensus 
communis as common sense, we should take inspiration from the Latin roots of the 
phrase and refer to it as a "shared or common understanding". One can see from the 
range of definitions above that this is not the only interpretation of the Latin terms; 
however, I believe it is the best way to understand how Arendt wants to use the term, 
especially in regards to political judgments. For the remainder of this chapter, I will refer 
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to the original Latin phrase, but for a proper understanding of the phrase, I suggest using 
my preferred translation of "shared or common understanding". 
For Arendt, the sensus communis is the basis for communication and without the 
sensus communis we would lose our 'sanity'. Arendt expresses this idea in both The 
Human Condition and Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy. First, Arendt describes 
the sensus communis in The Human Condition as, 
The only character of the world by which to gauge its reality is its being 
common to us all, and common sense occupies such a high rank in the 
hierarchy of political qualities because it is the one sense that fits into 
reality as a whole our five strictly individual senses and the strictly 
particular data they perceive. It is by virtue of common sense that the other 
sense perceptions are known to disclose reality and are not merely felt as 
irritations of our nerves or resistance sensations of our body. A noticeable 
decrease in common sense in any given community and a noticeable 
increase in superstition and gullibility are therefore almost infallible signs 
of alienation from the world (208-209). 
Arendt, in Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, states that this notion is found 
in Kant's work as well. 
Kant, quite in the same vein, remarks in his Anthropology that insanity 
consists in having lost this common sense that enables us to judge as 
spectators; and the opposite of it is a sensus privatus, a private 
sense, ... implying that our logical faculty, the faculty that enables us to 
draw conclusions from premises, could indeed function without 
communication- except that then, namely, if insanity has caused the loss 
of common sense, it would lead to insane results precisely because it has 
separated itself from the experience that can be valid and validated only in 
the presence of others (64). 
Arendt is essentially arguing that although we have private sense data, which 
comes to us via our five physical senses, we would not be able to make sense of these 
sensations without the presence of others to validate our perceptions. For the most part, 
this is exactly how we make sense of reality. For example, if a number of people are 
together and one person thinks he or she sees something in the distance, say a dog or a 
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cat, this person will ask the others in this group if they had in fact seen the same object to 
validate what he or she has seen in the distance. If the remainder of the group testifies 
that they have not seen this object, then the individual may state that his or her experience 
was a hallucination or a mistake in his or her visual experience. 
However, Kant asserts that we do not seek validation for aesthetic judgments 
socially (Judgment). When one makes an aesthetic judgment such as "This is beautiful," 
and another observer says "That is ugly," one never questions whether one is correct in 
his or her judgment. One would never say "Maybe I am wrong and this thing really is 
ugly." Rather, one would say something like "Of course this thing is beautiful." 
Therefore, aesthetic judgments have a universality quality. Natalie Oman expresses this 
sense of the universality of an aesthetic judgment such as a judgment of beauty by 
arguing that our subjective experience is that all people ought to judge this object as 
beautiful as well. According to Oman, 
... ajudgment of taste claims that everyone ought to give his or her 
approval to the beautiful object because of a subjective principle which 
Kant regards as 'a common sense' and not because of a theoretical 
objective necessity ... Thus, a judgment of taste takes on the character of an 
objectively universal judgment except insofar as we do not claim an 
unconditioned necessity for the judgment, but only claim that everyone 
ought to give their assent ( 4 ). 
The point Arendt is trying to make, and that I am trying to illustrate with my 
examples, is that judgments are essentially social. This is not only true of judgments, but, 
as Arendt says, of our nature as human beings. " ... the 'sociability' of man, that is the fact 
that no man can live alone, that men are interdependent not merely in their needs and 
cares but in their highest faculty, the human mind, which will not function outside of 
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human society" (Lectures 1 0). This idea of sociability underlies what Arendt believes is 
characteristic of political judgments. 2 As d 'Entreves comments, 
Political opinions, she [Arendt] claimed, can never be formed in private; 
rather, they are formed, tested, and enlarged within a public context of 
argumentation and debate. Public debate and discussion is indeed crucial 
to the formation of opinions that can claim more than subjective validity; 
individuals may hold personal opinions on many subject matters, but they 
can form representative opinions only by testing and purifying their views 
through a process of democratic debate and enlightenment (13). 
Arendt herself says in her Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy that" ... when 
one judges, one judges as a member of a community" (72). However, I believe there is a 
problem with this statement. How can an individual member of a community speak on 
behalf of the entire community? Arendt's solution to this problem is her distinction 
between the actor and the spectator. 
1.3 The Actor and the Spectator 
When one judges as a member of a community, the goal one wants to achieve, 
according to Arendt, is impartiality (Lectures 42). Impartiality is crucial for Arendt when 
it comes to making judgments, especially within a political context. The easiest way to 
understand Arendt's concern is to look at the contemporary political philosophical 
problem of making judgments within a multicultural society. For example, if culture A 
has value X, which is in direct contradiction to culture B's value Y, then how are these 
two cultures supposed to interact with one another while sharing the same community? If 
each culture's members do not take into account the views of the other culture's 
members, which Arendt calls being biased, then this inability to accommodate opposing 
2 In addition, it will be shown later in this chapter that this idea of sociability will underlie her concept of 
enlarged mentality. 
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perspectives has a strong chance of resulting in a conflict of values between members of 
these two cultures that inhabit the same geographical area. Examples of such conflicts are 
ubiquitous. One infamous example of such conflict was the tension generated by the 
work of the cartoonists who depicted the prophet Muhammad in the Danish newspaper 
Jyllands-Posten on September 30, 2005 and Muslims who believe it is blasphemous to 
portray the prophet Muhammad in any form. People who support the publication of the 
cartoon argue for the right of free speech while those against the publication of the 
cartoon cite an interpretation of the Koran which suggests it is wrong to depict 
Muhammad. The conflict grew due to each side's incompatible perspectives. 
Given Arendt's concern with bias and impartiality, this may give us some insight 
as to why she viewed Kant's theory of aesthetic judgments as his 'unwritten' political 
philosophy. One problem Arendt saw with Kant's moral philosophy was its solipsistic 
[my term] nature. According to Arendt, 
In the center of Kant's moral philosophy stands the individual; in the 
center ofhis philosophy of history (or, rather his philosophy of nature) 
stands the perpetual progress of the human race, or mankind. (Therefore: 
History from a general viewpoint). The general viewpoint or standpoint is 
occupied, rather, by the spectator, who is a 'world citizen' or, rather, a 
'world spectator'. It is he who decides, by having an idea of the whole, 
whether, in any single, particular event, progress is being made (Lectures 
58). 
This is where Arendt makes her distinction between the 'actor' and the 
'spectator'. According to Arendt, 
... the spectator occupies a position that enables him to see the whole; the 
actor, because he is part of the play, must enact his part- he is partial by 
definition. The spectator is impartial by definition - no part is assigned to 
him. Hence, withdrawal from direct involvement to a standpoint outside 
the game is a condition sine qua non of all judgment (Lectures 55). 
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Arendt then refers to Plato to argue further that the spectator is indeed in a better 
position to judge than the actor. Arendt appeals to Plato's example of the cave and his 
divided line of knowledge. Briefly, Plato divides knowledge into a hierarchy of levels; he 
believed the lowest level were illusions or mere appearances and the highest constituted 
was knowledge. Plato defines these two extreme levels as doxa or opinion (the lowest 
level) and episteme or knowledge (the highest level). In his example of the cave, the 
slaves who are chained at the base of the cave can only see shadows and assume that the 
shadows are the real objects. It is only when these slaves move away from the level of 
appearances, leaving their current perspective to tum and see true reality that the slaves 
will reach episteme (Plato The Republic). Arendt uses Plato's example of the cave to 
further support her prioritization of the spectator over the actor. She links the actor with 
those who only have doxa and the spectator with those who possess episteme . 
. . . what the actor is concerned with is doxa, fame - that is, the opinion of 
others (the word doxa means both 'fame' and 'opinion) ... the actor is 
dependent on the opinion of the spectator; he is not autonomous (in Kant's 
language); he does not conduct himself according to an innate voice of 
reason but in accordance with what spectators would expect of him. The 
standard is the spectator. And this standard is autonomous ... Here one 
escapes from the cave of opinions altogether and goes hunting for truth -
no longer the truth of the games in the festival but the truth of things that 
are everlasting, that cannot be different from what they are (all human 
affairs can be different from they actually are) and therefore are necessary 
(Lectures 55). 
But how is the spectator able to achieve this 'general standpoint'? 
1.4 Enlarged Mentality 
We achieve the general standpoint through what Arendt calls 'enlarged thought' 
or 'enlarged mentality'. Enlarged mentality is yet another term Arendt borrows from 
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Kant's philosophy and it is essentially " ... the notion that one can 'enlarge' one's own 
thought so as to take into account the thoughts of others" (Lectures 43). 
'Enlarged thought' is the result of first "abstracting from the limitations 
which contingently attach to our own judgment," of disregarding its 
"subjective private conditions ... by which so many are limited," that is, 
disregarding what we usually call self-interest, which, according to Kant, 
is not enlightened or capable of enlightenment but is in fact limiting. The 
greater the reach- the larger the realm in which the enlightened individual 
is able to move from standpoint to standpoint - the more 'general' will be 
his thinking (Lectures 43). 
Arendt says that enlarged mentality is accomplished by " .... "comparing our 
judgment with the possible rather than the actual judgments of others, and by putting 
ourselves in the place of any other man." The faculty that makes this possible is called 
imagination" (Lectures 43). Enlarged mentality is the collection of standpoints we 
imaginatively represent to ourselves whenever we make a judgment in order to escape the 
prejudices of the actor in order to reach the standpoint of the spectator. Arendt 
characterizes the method of enlarged thinking as 'going visiting'. According to Arendt, 
"To think with an enlarged mentality means that one trains one's imagination to go 
visiting [my italics]" (Lectures 43). 
Arendt's concept of going visiting is discussed in great detail by Lisa Disch. 
Disch characterizes going visiting as describing " ... the work that the imagination does in 
an act of judgment" (157). Disch also draws attention to a difference between Kant's and 
Arendt's account of imagination. 
In Kant's account, the imagination establishes the critical distance that 
makes it possible to assume a general standpoint. But for Arendt, this 
reflective or representative function is only one aspect of the work of the 
imagination. There is also a bridging function that makes present others 
perspectives for the purpose of going visiting (157). 
11 
detail: 
Disch goes on to quote Arendt who discusses this bridging aspect in further 
Only imagination is capable of what we know as "putting things in their 
proper distance" and which actually means that we should be strong 
enough to remove those which are too close until we can see and 
understand them without bias and prejudice, strong enough to bridge the 
abysses of remoteness until we can see and understand those that are too 
far away as though they were our own affairs. This removing some things 
and bridging the abysses to others is part of the interminable dialogue for 
whose purposes direct experience establishes too immediate and too close 
a contact and mere knowledge erects an artificial barrier ( qtd. in Disch 
157). 
Unexpectedly, however, Arendt goes on to claim that enlarged mentality is not 
empathy. In fact, Arendt is adamant in stating that enlarged mentality is not empathy. She 
says this in a number of texts. In her Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, Arendt 
says, "The trick of critical thinking [enlarged mentality] does not consist in enormously 
enlarged empathy through which one can know what actually goes on in the mind of all 
others" (Lectures 43). In her article "Truth and Politics", Arendt describes why this 
representation of other's standpoints does not constitute a theory of empathy. 
I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, 
by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; 
that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly 
adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look 
upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of 
empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of 
counting noses and joining a majority but ofbeing and thinking in my own 
identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have 
present in my mind while I am pondering a given issue, and the better I 
can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the 
stronger will be my capacity for representative thinking and the more valid 
my final conclusions, my opinion (241 ). 
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Arendt's work in political philosophy, especially her work on enlarged mentality 
and judgment was not only influential during Arendt's time, but has also influenced the 
work of many contemporary philosophers. 
1.5 Benhabib & Young 
Seyla Benhabib, a contemporary political and ethical philosopher, argues against 
the dominant moral theories of Ji.irgen Habermas and John Rawls. Habermasian discourse 
ethics for example has set up a dichotomy within ethical/political discourse that separates 
concepts such as justice and concepts such as the Aristotelian 'good life'. According to 
Benhabib, however, we should" ... reconsider, revise, and perhaps reject the dichotomies 
between justice versus the good life, interests versus needs, norms versus values upon 
which the discourse model, upon Habermas' interpretation of it, rests" (170). Benhabib's 
proposed solution is what she refers to as 'interactive universalism'. Benhabib believes 
the key difference between her interactive universalism and the discursive model is that 
both Rawls and Habermas rely upon, what Benhabib characterizes as, the 'generalized 
other'. 3 Instead, Benhabib insists that we must conceive of others as concrete, and during 
moral discourse with the concrete other, we reverse positions with the other. It is in 
Benhabib's emphasis on the reversibility of perspectives that she draws upon Arendt's 
notion of enlarged mentality that states the moral perspectives of others are reversible. 
Although Benhabib disagrees with Arendt's distinction between political and 
moral judgments, Benhabib does use Arendt's notion of enlarged mentality to describe 
moral judgments (141). According to Benhabib, what is characteristic of moral 
3 Benhabib's notion of the 'generalized other' and the 'concrete other' will be explained in full detail in the 
last chapter. 
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judgments is that they are inescapable as an aspect of the human condition. Moral 
judgment is what we 'always already' exercise in virtue of being immersed in a network 
of human relationships that constitute our life together (Benhabib 125). Moral judgments, 
then, are made through moral respect between self and other through 'symmetrical 
reciprocity', which entails that the perspectives of self and other are reversible. 
Conversely, in her article, "Asymmetrical Reciprocity", Young argues against 
ethical theories that insist one adopt the perspective of the other in order to make moral 
judgments. Young argues that assumed symmetry between perspectives of self and other 
impedes that project. As Young states, "It is neither possible nor morally desirable for 
persons engaged in moral interaction to adopt one another's standpoint" (39). 
Instead of a theory of symmetrical reciprocity, Young develops a theory of 
asymmetrical reciprocity which holds that a 
... communicative ethics should develop an account of the non-
substitutable relation of moral subjects. Each participant in a 
communication situation is distinguished by a particular history and social 
position that makes their relation asymmetrical. .. A communicative theory 
of moral respect should distinguish between taking the perspective of the 
other people into account, on the one hand, and imaginatively taking their 
positions, on the other hand" ( 40). 
Young characterizes Benhabib' s interpretation of Arendt's notion of "enlarged 
mentality" as we 'owe moral respect' to the other's perspective or standpoint, and for a 
person to acknowledge others to be as valuable as one's self means that both positions are 
'symmetrical and reversible'. When this is applied to judgment, specifically moral 
judgment, Benhabib takes Arendt's notion of 'enlarged mentality' and uses it to reflect on 
"the basis ofthe contextualized narratives ofmoral subjects" (40). When this is done, we 
are able to recognize the needs and interests of all parties equally; only when this is done 
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can we make judgments. Through 'enlarged mentality' we are able to imaginatively 
represent the point of view of the other. 
Young quotes Benhabib: 
The enlarged thought of moral judgment requires for its successful 
exercise the ability to take the standpoint of the other ... The more 
perspectives we are able to present to ourselves, all the more we are likely 
to appreciate the possible act-descriptions through which others will 
identify needs. Finally, the more we are able to think from the perspective 
of others, all the more can we make vivid to ourselves the narrative 
histories of others involved ( qtd. in Young 40). 
Young has three arguments against symmetrical reciprocity. First, Young states that 
this idea of symmetry in our relation obscures the difference and particularity of the 
other's position. Symmetry suggests that people are able to understand one another's 
perspectives because we are all similar; we are able to see ourselves "reflected in the 
other people and find that they see themselves reflected in us" (Young 44). Young says 
this is a conceptual projection of sameness among people at the expense of their 
differences. We each have our different life-stories, or narratives, emotional habits, and 
so on, that make our positions irreversible (Young 45). 
Second, it is onto logically impossible for people in one social position to adopt the 
perspective ofthose in another social position. To recognize the other as other and self as 
self means: " ... she is an 'I' to herself as I am an 'I' to myself and that I am an 'other' to 
her just as she is an 'other' to me (Young 46). According to Young, however, 
This relation of self and other is asymmetrical and irreversible, even 
though it is reciprocal. The reciprocal recognition by which I know that I 
am other for you just as you are other for me cannot entail a reversibility 
of perspectives precisely because our positions are partly constituted by 
the perspectives each ofus has on the others (46-47). 
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Finally, taking the perspective of the other, for Young, can have "politically 
undesirable consequences" (44). Young points out that when people try to put themselves 
in the position of others, "they often put themselves, with their own particular experiences 
and privileges," in the positions of the person in which they are trying to represent in this 
enlarged mentality (48). Young goes on to say, "When privileged people put themselves 
in the position of those who are less privileged, the assumptions derived from their 
privilege often allow them unknowingly to misrepresent the other's situation" (48). 
In other words, sometimes when people try to represent another's standpoint 
characterized as symmetrical reciprocity the standpoint is 'tainted' by the original 
standpoint. For example, Joe is a businessman who works for a corporation in downtown 
Toronto and Bob is a homeless teenager also from Toronto. If Joe tried to exchange 
perspectives, which is characteristic of symmetrical reciprocity, in order to achieve a 
better understanding of Bob's life, according to Young, then what is likely to happen is 
that Joe may not be completely open to Bob's situation. Joe will likely try to judge Bob 
as if Bob had the same expectations and goals as Joe, assuming that for some reason Bob 
has done something wrong in his life to put him in this homeless position. Joe may not be 
open to hearing Bob's life story in order to find out more about Bob and listening to Bob 
tell him why or how he is in the situation he is in. 
Young's positive account of asymmetrical reciprocity entails understanding the 
other by listening to her or him: this is Young's notion of moral humility 
Her descriptions of her life and the relation ofher physical situation to the 
social possibilities available to her will point out aspects of her situation 
that I would not have thought of without her explanation. In this way I 
come to an understanding of her point of view (53). 
16 
I believe that Benhabib would respond to Young's interpretation ofher work by 
saying Young seems to think Benhabib is advocating a form of empathy to understand 
the perspective of the other in enlarged mentality. However, according to Benhabib, 
Such capacity for judgment is not empathy, as Arendt also observes, for it 
does not mean emotionally assuming or accepting the point of view of the 
other. It means merely making present to oneself what the perspectives of 
others involved are or could be and whether I could 'woo their consent' in 
acting the way I do ... To 'think from the perspective of everyone else' is to 
know 'how to listen' to what the other is saying, or when the voices of 
others are absent, to imagine to oneself a conversation with the other as 
my dialogue partner. 'Enlarged thought' [mentality] is best realized 
through a dialogic or discursive ethic' (13 7). 
In the following chapter, I will argue that enlarged mentality relies upon a form of 
empathy and I will attempt to ground this claim by developing a theory of subjectivity 
and its relationship to empathy. Many of ethical theories do not provide a detailed 
phenomenological description of human subjectivity and how it relates to their respective 
ethical theories. Seyla Benhabib, for example, argues that we assume the position of the 
concrete other without providing the phenomenological grounding necessary to establish 
the concrete other. In order that I do not follow suit, I will devote my attention to 
grounding this theory of empathy in human subjectivity. In grounding this theory of 
empathy in the human condition, I will demonstrate how this theory of empathy is 
essential to Arendt's notion of enlarged mentality. 
This section will address empathy's relationship to consciousness. Although I 
agree with Benhabib's and Young's insistence on the importance ofthe other's narrative 
in order to understand the other; however, this will be seen as the first hint of a theory 
based on empathy. If we focus on someone's narrative, then we must also focus on his or 
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her emotional state 4. For emotions, as I will argue, aid in our decision making processes. 
Therefore, to understand why one person makes the decisions that she or her does, one 
must understand the emotional processes that aid this person in her or his decision-
making processes. In order to accomplish this task in the paper, I will now discuss the 
work of Antonio Damasio. 
4 It is generally assumed, as is hinted at by Arendt's definition of empathy, that empathy is the sharing of 
an emotional state as another person. Although, the definition I later expose differs from this definition, it is 
important nevertheless to discuss how important emotions can be in a theory of empathy. 
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Chapter Two 
2.1 Reason & Emotions 
Throughout the history of western philosophy, the distinguishing feature of 
human beings has often been thought to be rationality. But what is the relation between 
emotions and reason? Some philosophers argue that the emotions inhibit reason and we 
can only be rational if we suppress or eliminate our emotions. This is explicit in Plato's 
works. Specifically, in the Phaedrus, Plato uses a metaphor of a chariot to portray the 
soul's tripartite nature. Plato compares the tripartite nature of the soul, which he describes 
in The Republic consisting in reason, spirit, and emotion (The Republic 441e- 442b), to 
that of a charioteer and two horses (Phaedrus 246a). Plato uses this analogy to describe 
how the black horse (which symbolizes the emotions) tries to steer the soul astray while 
the charioteer (which symbolizes reason) steers the chariot in the right direction. In this 
metaphor, we see that emotions and reason are at odds with one another and that reason 
must control the emotions in some way. 
Plato's sentiment can also be found in the Stoics' attitude towards the emotions. 
Where Plato believed emotions impede reason and that the charioteer steers the emotions 
towards the truth, some interpreters hold that the Stoics took a more radical position. 
Commentators such as Tad Brennan suggest that instead of simply learning to control 
emotions, the Stoics opted for the elimination of emotions. 5 Although there are 
contemporary researchers who adopt a Neo-Stoic perspective in the philosophy of the 
5 As Tad Brennan comments, "we all know roughly what it means to be stoical or stoic ... Being stoic means 
being unemotional, indifferent to pleasure and pain, resigned to fate" (3). Brennan also addresses the debate 
within Stoic philosophy about Stoics merely concealed their emotional state or whether the Stoics simply 
did not have emotional experiences. Brennan states, rather poetically, "But what about the idea that Stoics 
simply don't have emotions- not that they conceal or repress them, or exaggerate some to subdue others, 
but that they simply don't feel any? This Stoic is no hypocrite; the reason that he [the Stoic] neither winced 
nor cried aloud is that it simply didn't hurt" (6). Therefore, Brennan aligns himself with the camp that 
believes that the Stoics eliminated the emotions to the point where they no longer experienced emotions. 
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emotions, e.g., Martha Nussbaum (2004), there are, however, many other researchers 
who question the relationship between reason and emotion. Specifically, I will appeal to 
the work of Antonio Damasio, a neurophysiologist, who suggests that research shows 
how rationality in fact depends upon emotions. Damasio's description of the emotion's 
role in rationality complements the connection between the theory of empathy developed 
below and Arendt's enlarged mentality. The following case study will demonstrate that 
rationality depends upon emotions and that in order to talk about the other's narrative, we 
must be aware of, or at least give credence to, one's emotional state. 
2.2 Elliot's Story 
I begin with a summary of Antonio Damasio's case study of Elliot. Elliot was a 
good husband and father, who had a job with a business firm, and had a high professional 
and social status. However, Elliot began to experience severe headaches, and after a 
period of time he had a hard time concentrating. This condition worsened, and later it was 
discovered that the cause of Elliot's condition was a brain tumour. When the tumour was 
diagnosed it was the size of a small orange and was growing larger at an increasing rate. 
It [the tumour] was a meningioma, so-called because it arises out of the 
membranes covering the brain's surface, which are called meninges. 
Later ... Elliot's tumour had begun growing in the midline area, just above 
the nasal cavities, above the plane formed by the roof of the eye sockets. 
As the tumour grew bigger, it compressed both frontal lobes upward, from 
below (Damasio 35). 
Elliot survived the surgery while maintaining his intelligence, memory, motor 
skills, and use of language; however, "in many ways Elliot was no longer Elliot" 
(Damasio 36). Before the surgery, Elliot was a very organized individual, but after the 
surgery his caregivers had to help with what would have normally been rudimentary tasks 
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for him. Elliot needed motivation to get started in the morning in order to be prepared to 
go to work. Elliot also experienced similar problems at work. His biggest struggle at 
work was his time management, so much so that his employers and fellow employees 
could not trust him with a work schedule. If Elliot were given a series of tasks to perform 
at the beginning of the day and then asked to change the initial schedule in order to 
accomplish another, Elliot would sometimes continue with the old schedule or he would 
sometimes start a completely unrelated task he found more interesting " ... seeming losing 
sight of his main goal" (Damasio 36). 
It was frustrating for his family and researchers because there seemed to be a 
separation between Elliot's thoughts and his actions. Elliot knew what he had to do but 
was unable to put this knowledge into action. Researchers found after the surgery that he 
was still intelligent; he knew what was going on in the world around him. He watched the 
news and remembered names, dates, faces, and so on. He discussed current political 
issues and understood the current economic situation of the country. Elliot also had a 
fully functional memory. Elliot was later administered a variety of memory tests and 
scored with 100 and 95 percent accuracy. 
In short, perceptual ability, past memory, short-term memory, new 
learning, language, and the ability to do arithmetic were intact. Attention, 
the ability to focus on a particular mental content to the exclusion of 
others, was also intact; and so was working memory, which is the ability 
to hold information in mind over a period of many seconds and to operate 
on it mentally (Damasio 41 ). 
According to Damasio, "The tragedy of this otherwise healthy and intelligent man 
was that he was neither stupid nor ignorant, and yet he acted [my italics] often as if he 
were" (38). Elliot's seemingly irrational actions were reflected in his decision making 
processes. For example, if Elliot was given the task at work to read several case studies 
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and then organize them, he would read and understand the significance of each case 
study. He also knew how to organize these files just as anyone would in this particular 
workplace. Elliot, however, would read one case study so carefully that he would spend 
an entire day doing so. He would also spend an enormous amount of time deliberating on 
what sorting system he would use in order to categorize these files: "Should it be by date, 
size of document, pertinence to the case, or another" (36)? The problem was Elliot would 
spend so much time on the contemplation of how to accomplish the goal he would never 
actually accomplish it. As Damasio states, "One might say that the particular step of the 
task at which Elliot balked was actually being carried out too well, and at the expense of 
the overall purpose" (36). 
It was later discovered that Elliot's defects in decision-making processes were 
" ... accompanied by a reduction in emotional reactivity and feeling" (Damasio 51). 
Damasio hypothesized that the 'cold-bloodedness' ofElliot's reasoning " ... prevented 
him from assigning different values to different options, and made his decision-making 
landscape hopelessly flat" (51). It is here that we begin to see how rationality depends 
upon emotions. The outcome of this case study, and others cited by Damasio, suggests 
that one of the functions of the emotions is to add value to possible lines of action in 
order to aid in decision-making processes6• I now tum to the task of providing more 
detailed definitions of the terms 'reason' and 'rationality' in order to support my 
preceding claim. 
2.3 Definitions 
6 I will discuss the functions of the emotions in the section on the emotional marker hypothesis. 
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Following Damasio, I do not use the terms reason and rationality interchangeably 
because of the different connotations of the two. Damasio makes this point in the 
following way: 
I generally use the term reason as the ability to think and make inferences 
in an orderly, logical manner; and rationality as the quality of thought and 
behaviour that comes from reasoning and decision making 
interchangeably since not all reasoning processes are followed by a 
decision (269). 
This is consistent with Elliot's case because he could understand what he had to 
do (reason) but was unable to implement this reason in action. I use the term rationality to 
denote the ability to implement reason in action. 
I will use the term rationality to refer to the ability to implement reason into 
action. Like Ronald de Sousa, I take rationality to be a category, i.e., classifying things in 
'kinds'. Recall that for Aristotle, human beings are rational animals (Aristotle 
Nicomachean Ethics). Aristotle is using this definition in a categorical sense: in order to 
be a human being, an animal must meet the requirements of the category 'rational'. In 
order to be considered 'rational' one must at least be 'minimally rational'. In order to 
illustrate what I mean by the category of minimal rationality, I will describe de Sousa's 
example of a patient, Percival's reason for walking into a lake. 
Percival walks into a lake. He is crazy: in the light of his projects and his 
plans, his action makes no sense. But it was not somnambulism, nor was 
he pushed. He just wanted to walk into the lake. That's a crazy want, but 
in the light of just that isolated want his action is perfectly rational. And 
so, in light of some narrow context of wants, is every irrational action 
(160). 
Although Percival's reason (in the sense of motive) for walking into the lake is 
'crazy', nevertheless, Percival has met the condition of minimal rationality. Percival 
'evaluated' that he wanted to walk into the lake and chose to do so. Whether he has good 
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or bad reasons is irrelevant for an assessment of minimal rationality. To violate the 
principle of minimal rationality is to eradicate choice. For example, if Percival walked 
into the lake due to a neurological disease or was pushed, then his action would not be 
minimally rational. In order to classify an action as rational, it must be at least minimally 
rational. For de Sousa, minimal rationality is" ... a necessary condition of an intentional 
state or event's being describable as categorically rational, that under some description it 
can properly be said to be evaluatively rational" (160). Therefore, to be minimally 
rational, there has been a satisfaction of some condition to be recognized in the category 
of rationality. To return to Aristotle's example, in order to be human, a being must satisfy 
the condition of rationality. 
Recall Elliot's example. Elliot was not rational in the sense that he could not put 
his abstract reasoning into action. In addition, he did not meet the condition of minimal 
rationality because Elliot's actions were the result of a form of brain damage. The brain 
damage inhibited Elliot from making a conscious decision concerning his action, i.e., he 
could not provide a justification for his actions. 
2.4 Emotional Marker Hypothesis 
What then is the function of the emotions in rationality? Is there only one function 
of the emotions? In order to explore these questions, I will present Damasio's somatic 
marker hypothesis. However, I will refer to this hypothesis as the 'emotional marker 
hypothesis' because I believe using the term 'somatic' appears to refer simply to physical 
processes thereby setting up a distinction between mind and body. I will discuss later in 
the paper (in the section on embodiment in the second chapter) why this is problematic. I 
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want to use the emotional marker hypothesis to further develop my argument that 
emotions aid in decision-making processes. Recall Elliot's dilemma of how to categorize 
case studies at work. He could not assign a value to a particular strategy in order to finish 
the job. Emotional markers primarily assign value, although they are not sufficient for 
decision-making processes . 
.. . [Emotional markers] may not be sufficient for normal human decision-
making since a subsequent process of reasoning and final selection will 
still take place in many though not all instances. [Emotional markers] 
probably increase the accuracy and efficiency of the decision making 
process. Their absence reduces them (Damasio 173). 
How do these emotional markers work? Take for example a chain of actions one 
must perform any given morning: take a shower, eat breakfast, brush one's teeth, comb 
one's hair, get dressed, and pay the phone bill. These 'emotional markers' aid in the 
decision-making processes by adding a value to each task in order to determine what task 
to do first. For example, one could contemplate what to do first for infinity. You could 
have a shower first because you think you are dirty, but you have to pay the phone bill 
because it is overdue, but you are hungry and must eat breakfast, yet you have something 
stuck between your teeth so you must brush your teeth, and so on. Without assigning a 
value to these options this contemplation could deter you from accomplishing any of 
these tasks. Unfortunately, this was the predicament Elliot experienced with any set of 
tasks. 'Emotional markers' then assign values in order to" ... generate positive future 
outcomes" (Damasio 175). For example, if it is beneficial to pay the phone bill first, then 
paying the phone bill will be 'marked' emotionally as the most activity. When there is an 
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assignment of value, one is able to choose what task to accomplish in order to have a 
beneficial future outcome 7. 
This paper has established that one function of the emotions is to assign value. 
Another function of the emotions, I will argue, is the recognition of value. Martha 
Nussbaum claims that emotions are a form of evaluative judgment, in that emotions are 
intentional; emotions are judgments about things we take to be valuable (191 ). For 
example, Nussbaum examines the statement that her mother has died and the emotion(s) 
that follows: 
My mother has died. It strikes me, it appears to me, that a person of 
enormous value, who was central to my life, is no longer there. It feels as 
if a nail has entered my insides, as if life has suddenly a large rip or tear in 
it, a gaping hole. I see, as well, her wonderful face - both as tremendously 
loved and as forever lost to me. The appearance, in however many ways 
we picture it, is propositional: it combines the thought of importance with 
the thought of loss, its content is that this importance is lost. And it is 
evaluative: it does not just assert, "Betty Craven is dead." Central to the 
propositional content is my mother's enormous importance, both to herself 
as well as to me as an element in my life (192). 
Therefore, not only is there an assignment of value, another function of the 
emotions is the recognition of value. It is here in the recognition of value, that one is able 
to distinguish one emotion from another. According to Nussbaum, "Emotions are not 
about their objects merely in the sense of being pointed at them and let go, the way an 
arrow is let go against its target" (188). In other words, I am not emotional towards any 
particular object; there is something 'special' I perceive in the object I am intentional 
toward. Nussbaum states that part of the identity of the emotions relies on the perception 
7 For more details on the elaborate exposition ofDamasio's position please refer to Descartes' Error 
(1994). 
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of the object. Therefore, what distinguishes one emotion from another is its object and the 
way the object is perceived. As Nussbaum says, 
What distinguishes fear from hope, fear from grief, love from hate - is not 
so much the identity of the object, which might not change, but the way 
the object is perceived: in fear, as a threat, but with some chance for 
escape; in hope, as in some uncertainty, but with a chance for a good 
outcome; in grief as lost; in love as invested with a special sort of radiance 
(188). 
To tie all of these observations and arguments back to the purpose of this paper, I 
draw the reader's attention to the emphasis placed by Benhabib and Young upon the 
importance of narrative in understanding the other's perspective. This discussion of the 
emotional marker hypothesis shows the weakness of their common neglect of the 
importance of the other's emotional state for each individual's decision making 
processes. In order to understand the other's narrative, one must not overlook her or his 
emotional incentives for her or his actions. This inevitably leads us to ask, how can we 
understand the other's emotional incentive? It is normally held that the ability to 
understand another's emotional state constitutes the common understanding of empathy. 
Before, however, I develop this theory of empathy, it is necessary that I describe how this 
formulation of empathy fits into embodiment phenomenology. As I will argue, empathy 
is essential to embodiment phenomenology. Therefore, I must develop what I mean by 
embodiment phenomenology. 
2.5 A Note on Embodiment 
Embodiment phenomenology refers to the variety of phenomenology propounded 
by Maurice Merleau-Ponty. In both The Phenomenology of Perception and The Visible 
and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty says that our subjectivity must be understood as 
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embodied subjectivity. In so saying, Merleau-Ponty is objecting to the Husserlian notion 
that a transcendental subject constitutes meaning, i.e., the world is determined by a 'pure' 
subject.8 Merleau-Ponty's point is that we are not pure subjects and that we are both 
subject and object, and that this relationship must be seen as embodiment. The best way 
to illustrate this point is to look at Merleau-Ponty' s example of self-touch. 
If my left hand is touching my right hand, and if I should suddenly wish to 
apprehend my right hand the work of my left hand as it touches, this 
reflection of the body upon itself always miscarries the last moment: the 
moment I feel my left hand with my right hand, I correspondingly cease 
my right hand with my left hand (Visible 9). 
In self-touch, I am both the subject and the object of this sensation of touch. 
When my right hand touches my left hand my right acts as the subject and my left as the 
object. However, this is reflexive. My left hand also touches my right making my left 
hand the subject and my right hand the object. Also, as Zahavi states " ... this experience 
is crucial to empathy ... When my left hand touches my right ... I am experiencing myself 
in a manner that anticipates both the way in which an other would experience me and the 
way in which I would experience an other" (157). The point is that my subjectivity, or 
selfhood, is embodied within my lived body where I am both subject and object to myself 
and I recognize that the other has the same embodied subjectivity. As Merleau-Ponty 
notes, "If my consciousness has a body, why should not other bodies not 'have' 
consciousness?" (qtd. in Mensch 43). Here Merleau-Ponty does not mean any 'body' 
such as rocks and houses. As lngo Farin and James Hart note in their translation of 
Husserl's lectures, "In the later writings, it seems that Husserl makes a clear distinction 
between Leib, which we have usually have translated as "lived body" and Korper, which 
8 According to Michael Hammond et al, " ... many commentators have been sceptical about the accuracy of 
Merleau-Ponty's interpretations ofHusserl's work, and even about the existence of the passages cited or 
quoted from the (then) unpublished manuscripts" (11). 
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we have usually have translated as "body", "physical body" or "body-thing" (xxviii). 
Therefore, by the phenomenological usage of 'lived body' I am referring to bodies like 
other subjects as you and I. This is characteristic of embodiment. But, as James Mensch 
cautions us embodiment " ... should not be thought of as inhabiting a body as if it were 
something placed in a box" (44). 
This image of selfhood as 'contained' comes from a Cartesian conception of mind 
and body. The problems with Cartesian dualism are well known9. Although many 
contemporary commentators reject Cartesian dualism most famously Gilbert Ryle who 
coined the phrase "The Ghost in the Machine" to refer to Descartes' dualism 
(Concept).Nevertheless, the language of separating mind and body as distinct entities is 
still commonly espoused in contemporary philosophy of mind (Concept). 
One such example of Cartesian language in contemporary philosophy of mind is 
the debate on the problem of epiphenomenalism. Epiphenomenalism is the claim that 
consciousness does exist but that it does not do anything, or in other words, that 
consciousness is causally inefficacious. Epiphenomenalism, for example, endorses the 
Cartesian model that mind and body are separate while insisting that the physical world is 
causally closed, i.e., that every physical event has a physical cause. If this is the case, 
then if consciousness does exist, it does not cause, or do, anything. "Physical events can 
9 I refer to this position as 'Cartesian dualism' rather than simply 'dualism' because there are other forms of 
dualism in the contemporary philosophy of mind, e.g., property dualism. Property dualism claims that 
conscious experience "involves properties of an individual that are not entailed by the physical properties 
of that individual, although they may depend lawfully on those properties." (Chalmers 125) Conscious 
experience, therefore, is "a feature over and above the physical features of the world." (Chalmers 125) 
Property dualism is not to be confused with Descartes' substance dualism. A property dualist does not say 
that there are two separate substances in the universe; rather, a property dualist would say, " ... there are 
properties of individuals in this world -the phenomenal properties -that are onto logically independent of 
physical properties." (Chalmers 125) 
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have only physical explanations, and consciousness is not physical, so consciousness 
plays no explanatory role whatsoever" (Searle 4 7). 
On the other hand, embodiment theorists hold that "The mind is not located in the 
head, but is embodied in the whole organism embedded in its environment" (Thompson 
"Consciousness" 3). Therefore, embodiment must not be seen as either a form of 
materialism or subjective idealism. For as Mensch states, 
For the materialist...the subject is reduced to the world. It is grounded 
(explained) by its material, mathematically describable "axiomatic" 
processes and laws ... [However] embodiment characterizes the selfs 
grasp of the world positions as neither a ground of nor as grounded by the 
world ... the self is simply the "place" of presence ... The world's coming 
into presence both requires and determines this place. Thus, without the 
self, its environing world cannot appear ... Such determination does not 
reduce the selfs consciousness to an illusion. Similarly, the selfs role in 
providing a place of presence for the world does not reduce the world to a 
mere content of consciousness ( 41 ). 
Therefore, embodiment must be seen as a 'middle theory' between two extreme 
views: materialism and subjective idealism. The problem with these two viewpoints is 
that that they both pick an extreme side within the Cartesian dichotomy, i.e., materialism 
claims all is material, and subjective idealism claims that all is mental. Embodiment does 
not see mind and body as being separate, contradictory terms. This is captured by Stein, 
who rejects Descartes' dualism of soul, by taking an Aristotelian position10: "Our 
10 When Aristotle says that the mind (soul in Aristotle's terminology) is the cause of the living body he is 
essentially saying that the mind acts as both the formal and final cause (De Anima II 4, 415b 16). As a 
formal cause, the mind is the "essential whatness of a body" (De Anima II I, 412b5). The formal cause, or 
the 'essential whatness', is the definition ofthe object (Physics II 3, 194b26). The raw materials have been 
put together, or ordered, in such a way, that we can distinguish what this thing is, or in other words, we are 
able to recognize its essence. Therefore, if the mind is the formal cause of the body, then it is senseless to 
speak of the two as being separate ontological entities. According to Aristotle, "That is why we can wholly 
dismiss as unnecessary the question whether the soul and the body are one: it is as meaningless to ask 
whether the wax and the shape given to it by the stamp are one, or generally the matter of a thing and that 
of which it is the matter (De Anima II 1, 412b5-6), which is one ofDescartes' arguments for dualism. 
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proposed division between soul and body was an artificial one, for the soul is always 
necessarily a soul in a body" (38). 
Mensch also asserts that intersubjectivity is impossible under the Cartesian 
dichotomy. He states that under the Cartesian conception of the self, the self is "an 
objective observer" and that "Such a self never encounters another" ( 43). Mensch 
explains this observation as follows: Within a Cartesian scheme others 
Appear over and against the observer, who distinguishes himself from 
them as a subject who, for all intents and purposes, is a disembodied 
self ... .In other words, I have to conceive him both as an object and as a 
nonextended conscious subject. Such a disembodied consciousness, which 
simply a sheer attending, has "no outside" and hence cannot be made 
objective (Mensch 43). 
Mensch asserts that we must have a new definition of self, i.e., an embodied 
notion of self. In addition, as I will now develop, empathy is essential to an embodiment 
theory ofintersubjectivity. 
2.6 Definitions of Empathy 
Before I go on any further, I must address a possible confusion in terminology. 
One of the major dangers of using the term 'empathy' is confusing the ordinary language 
usage of the term with the philosophical usage of the term (this does not mean that the 
philosophical usage is contrary to the ordinary usage; just that they are not identical). In 
this section, I will briefly examine how I will use the term 'empathy', and empathy's 
relationship to a theory ofintersubjectivity. 
One major problem with the term 'empathy' is that there are numerous ways the 
term is used, even within academic fields. According to Adam Smith, there are several 
definitions of empathy within the field of psychology: 
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The term empathy refers to sensitivity to, and understanding of, the mental 
states of others. Hollin (1240) has written that "the ability to see the world, 
including one's own behaviour, from another person's point of view is to 
display empathy." According to Hogan (308), empathy is "the act of 
constructing for oneself another person's mental state." Hoffman (48) has 
defined empathy as "an affective response more appropriate to someone 
else's situation than to one's own." Eisenberg and Strayer (5) have 
regarded empathy as "an emotional response that stems from another's 
emotional state or condition and that is congruent with the other's 
emotional state or situation." (3). 
As we shall see, psychologists are not alone in defining the term empathy. 
Philosophers also have their own definitions of empathy, which sometimes conflict with 
the psychological definitions. According to Evan Thompson, "Psychologists have used 
the term 'empathy' to describe at least three different processes: (l)feeling what another 
person is feeling; (2) knowing what another person is feeling; and (3) responding 
compassionately to another person's distress" ("Human Experience" 264). Although, like 
Thompson, I am not going to argue that the psychologists' usage of the term is correct or 
incorrect, for the purposes of this section I will explain empathy from a 
phenomenological perspective. Phenomenologists offer a detailed structural analysis of 
empathy and have distinguished at least four main aspects of the full performance of 
empathy: 
1. The coupling or pairing of my living body with your living body 
in perception and action. 
2. The imaginary movement or transposition of myself into your 
place. 
3. The interpretation of you as an Other to me and of me as an 
Other to you. 
4. The ethical and moral perception of you as a person (Thompson 
"Human Experience": 264). 
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For the remainder of this section, I will address these four aspects of the full 
performance of empathy in tum as set out by Evan Thompson 11 • In each section I will 
draw upon the work of phenomenologists including, James Mensch, Dan Zahavi, Edith 
Stein, Edmund Husserl, and Merleau-Ponty to support each aspect Thompson has set out. 
2. 7 Empathy & Coupling 
The first aspect of empathy is coupling. According to Thompson, 'coupling' or 
'pairing' means" ... an associative bonding or linking of self and other on the basis of 
their bodily similarity" ("Human Experience" 264). In other words, this aspect of 
empathy is the recognition that the other's body is similar to my own. This is important 
because this aspect is not similar to the common understanding of the term empathy 
discussed earlier, namely coming to know the content of another's emotional state. 
According to Thompson, this aspect of empathy" ... is not simply the grasping of another 
person's particular experience (sadness, joy, and so on), but on a more fundamental 
aspect the experience of another as an embodied subject of experience like oneself' 
("Consciousness" 17). 
Edith Stein illustrates this point beautifully. According to Stein, when we perceive 
the other's hand on the table we notice that "The hand resting on the table does not lie 
there like the book beside it. It 'presses' against the table more or less strongly; it lies 
11 It is important to note that I have called these four kinds of empathy as 'aspects' and not 'levels' or 
'stages' as though I were setting up a similar system as Jean Piaget's moral development in children where 
children pass through several stages during their development. To do so would violate the 
phenomenological nature these aspects are based on. Although it is unclear if Thompson wishes to do so 
because in some works (2001) he refers to these aspects as 'levels' but in other works (2002), he strictly 
uses the term 'aspects'. I must thank my professors, William Sweet and James Bradley for this observation. 
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there limpid or stretched; and I 'see' these sensations of pressure and tension in a con-
primordial way" (54). 
It is also at this point that, as Thompson says, "We find here a clear connection 
between phenomenology and recent cognitive neuroscience, in particular to ... mirror 
neuron findings" ("Consciousness" 17). 
Mirror neurons are a particular class of visuomotor neurons originally 
discovered in a sector (area F5) of monkey's ventral premotor cortex. 
Their defining functional characteristics is that they become active both 
when the monkey makes a particular action (like grasping an object or 
holding it) and when it observes another individual (monkey or human) 
making a similar action (Rizzolatti 37). 
However, this phenomenon is not present solely in monkeys but in humans as 
well. Rizzolatti explains that there is 
... evidence on the existence of a mirror system in humans. It is important 
to note that when single neuron recording technique is used, information is 
typically obtained concerning a single brain area or center. Thus, the fact 
that up to now only one mirror neuron circuit has been defined in the 
monkey does not exclude the existence of other mirror neuron circuits. 
This point is important to stress because ... circuits with mirror properties 
appear to be more widespread in humans than in monkeys (39). 12 
Thompson believes that this research has great implications for a theory of 
empathy. Thompson's analysis deserves to be quoted at length: 
These findings are notable for several reasons. First, the neural system for 
recognizing the intentional meaning of the actions of another agent 
appears to be primarily of a practical nature, rather than inferential or 
judgmental, for it involves the direct pairing or matching of the bodies of 
self and other. There seems to be an immediate pairing between the 
animal's understanding of its own actions and its understanding of those 
of another, an understanding whose structure is not that of an initial 
perception of a non-interpreted bodily movement followed by a judgment 
that attributes meaning to the movement and thereby interprets it as an 
action. Rather, the movement of the other is already understood as a goal-
12 For more details on the elaborate exposition of mirror neurons refer to Maxim Stamenov and Vittorio 
Gallese (2002) Mirror Neurons and the Evolution of Brain and Language. 
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directed action because of its match to a self-performed action ... this kind 
of non-inferential bodily pairing of self and other is one of the hallmarks 
of the phenomenological analysis of empathy. Indeed the mirror neuron 
findings support Husserl' s position that our empathic experience of 
another depends on one's 'coupling' or 'pairing' with the other, rather 
than some kind of affective fusion, as some ofHusserl's contemporaries 
held ("Consciousness" 9). 
This aspect of empathy does not make any claims about the content of the other's 
experience; rather, the claim is that the other is a being like us. Therefore, at this aspect 
we are not insisting on the ethical status of the other; we are simply making observations 
on the other's ontological status. To use phenomenological jargon, we are bracketing the 
ethical status of the other in order that we can return to it when we have a proper 
grounding for it. 
2.8 Empathy and Transposition 
In the second aspect of empathy, according to Thompson, we move from the 
recognition of the embodied other to the "content ofthe other's experience" 
("Consciousness" 17). This aspect is very similar to the common understanding of 
empathy, but as we shall see, the ordinary understanding has to be fleshed out in a 
philosophical manner. 
However, Young would object to this aspect of empathy on the grounds that no 
one can experience the content of another's experience. One may also argue that ifwe 
have access to the other's content, how can we sustain the distinction between self and 
other? Zahavi, who quotes Husserl, states that primordial experiences aid in self-identity. 
"Had I the same access to the consciousness of the other as I have to my own, the other 
would cease being an other and instead become a part of myself' (qtd. in Zahavi 154). 
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This is the case because anything that I have direct access to through 
consciousness I take as a part of myself. In Stein's terms, my access to my consciousness 
is a 'zero-point of orientation'. It is the zero point insofar as it is the center of experience. 
It is a permanent 'here' point whereas others have the experience of a 'there' point. As 
Walraut Stein notes in the introduction to On The Problem of Empathy the zero point for 
Edith Stein is that which" ... I relate my body [to] and everything outside of it. Whatever 
refers to the "I" is given as at no distance from the zero point and everything given at a 
distance from the zero point is also given at a distance from the "I" ... Thus the living 
body as a whole is at the zero point while all physical bodies are outside of it" (xv). The 
notion of the zero point will become very important in the later aspects of empathy and 
will answer some of the concerns raised by Arendt, Benhabib, and Young regarding the 
nature of empathy in the first chapter. I will address the above objections in the last 
chapter in two ways: first, by arguing that our experience of the other's content is not 
what Stein calls, primordial and second, by arguing that empathy is not an aU-or-nothing 
phenomenon ("Human Experience" 265). 
First, by primordial I mean the way we experience our own sensations through 
bodily presence. For example, if I stub my toe against the chair, the sensation of pain I 
will feel is primordially mine through bodily presence. When I say my experience of the 
other occurs through transposition I do not mean that I have the same primordial 
experience, but I am not saying that all of our experiences are primordial either. As Edith 
Stein says, "But not all experiences are primordially given nor primordial in their content. 
Memory, expectation, and fancy do not have their object bodily present before them" (8). 
For example, ifl recall the pain three days after I stubbed my toe and reflect on how 
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much it hurt, then this memory is not primordial but yet I still know about the pain. Also, 
if I see you stub your toe against the chair, your pain is not primordial to me but I can 
relate to the pain you are feeling. I do not have the exact same pain that you are feeling 
because I can only experience my own pain primordially, but I relate to your pain non-
primordially. Again, according to Stein, 
This other subject is primordial although I do not experience its 
primordiality; his joy is primordial although I do not experience it as 
primordial. In my non-primordial experience I feel, as it were, led by a 
primordial one not experienced by me but still there, manifesting itself in 
my non-primordial experience (11). 
Saying that the grasp of the other's content is non-primordial sustains the concrete 
identity of self and other, which is characteristic ofBenhabib's position, namely her 
distinction between the generalized other and the concrete other. 13 
Second, empathy must not be seen as an ali-or-nothing phenomenon. By all-or-
nothing I am referring to an objection made to a theory of empathy that states it is 
impossible to experience another's mental content and therefore, any theory that is based 
on empathy does not have a solid foundation because it is impossible to experience 
another's experience. It is important to note, however, that although I may not experience 
the other's experience primordially, i.e., as bodily present, this does not mean that 
empathy is an empty pursuit. According to Zahavi, "Our experience and understanding of 
others is fallible. This should not cause us to conclude that we cannot understand others 
and that empathy is to be distrusted" (55). To say otherwise presupposes that there is a 
privileged access to the inner states of the subject alone and that it is the subject alone 
who experiences them primordially. However, as Zahavi quotes Merleau-Ponty: 
13 Benhabib's concept of the 'generalized other' and the 'concrete other' will be explained in detail in the 
last chapter. 
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We must reject the prejudice which makes 'inner realities' out oflove, 
hate or anger, leaving them accessible to one single witness: the person 
who feels them. Anger, shame, hate, and love are not psychic facts hidden 
at the bottom of another's consciousness: they are types of behaviour or 
styles of conduct which are visible from the outside. They exist on this 
face or in those gestures, not hidden behind them ( qtd. in Zahavi 151 ). 
Therefore, these 'inner realities' of anger and so on are publicly available to other 
subjects as recognizable bodily expressions. Zahavi also refers to empirical data that 
supports his claim. This is empirical research in pathology on people born with Mobius 
syndrome, which is a facial paralysis since birth that prevents those with the paralysis 
from making any facial expressions. Some researchers suggest that the reduced facial 
expressions resulting from this condition may lead to a reduced experience of feeling 
within the afflicted individual (153). Zahavi argues that the lack of feeling within oneself 
could be the result of two possible sources: first, this could be the result from" ... a lack of 
internal feedback from [the] skin and muscle movements in the face that might make the 
emotion more clearly defined", or it may be the result from the" ... lack of feedback from 
others, a social feedback that can be highly significant for what we feel" (153). 
Further psychological research supports Thompson's claim that empathy is not an 
ali-or-nothing phenomenon. Adam Smith hypothesizes in his article, "Cognitive Empathy 
and Emotional Empathy In Human Behaviour and Evolution" that there are seven models 
of the relationship between two forms of empathy, namely, what Smith calls, 'cognitive 
empathy' and 'emotional empathy' 14• Smith argues that the term empathy has been used 
in psychology to describe " ... two related human abilities: mental perspective taking 
14 For exact descriptions of Smith's seven models ofthe relationship between cognitive and emotional 
empathy please refer to Adam Smith (2006) "Cognitive Empathy and Emotional Empathy in Human 
Behaviour and Evolution" The Psychological Record 56: 3. 
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(cognitive empathy, CE) and the vicarious sharing of an emotion (emotional empathy, 
EE) (3). 
Furthermore, Smith goes on to say that one can have cognitive empathy without 
emotional empathy (although Smith also states there are benefits of having CE without 
EE and vice versa, which is consistent with the claim that empathy is not an all-or-
nothing phenomenon) 15, Smith does say that "True empathy arguably integrates CE 
[cognitive empathy] and EE [emotional empathy]" (4). Smith hypothesizes that there are 
several empathy disorders due to imbalances between these two, separable but 
complementary, forms of empathy: 
1) Cognitive empathy deficit disorder (CEDD), consisting of low CE 
ability, but high EE sensitivity. 
2) Emotional empathy deficit disorder (EEDD), consisting oflow EE 
sensitivity but high CE ability (9). 
On the basis of this distinction, Smith also predicts that two general empathy 
disorders exist: 
1) General empathy deficit disorder (GEDD), consisting of low CE ability 
and low EE sensitivity. 
2) General empathy surfeit disorder (GESD), consisting of high CE ability 
and high EE sensitivity (9). 
Smith also hypothesizes that these four disorders can be associated with autism, 
antisocial personality behaviour, schizoid personality disorder, and William's syndrome. 
For example, Smith hypothesizes that CEDD tends to be a part of autism, EEDD tends to 
be a part of antisocial personality disorder, that GEDD tends to be apart of schizoid 
personality disorder, and that GESD tends to be a part of Williams Syndrome (11-16). 
This is important to the discussion of Thompson's view that empathy is not an all-or-
nothing phenomenon because we can see through Smith's various accounts of empathy 
15 For more information of these benefits please refer to pages 5-7. 
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and disorders that although one may not exhibit characteristics of all of the forms of 
empathy, one can exhibit some variations of other forms of empathy. 
It should be apparent from Smith's definition of cognitive empathy, CE, that 
Arendt's notion of enlarged mentality is specifically this perspective taking. However, 
Arendt would object to the second definition, i.e., emotional empathy. Arendt specifically 
denies adopting the emotional standpoint of the other for she would see this as trying 'to 
be' the other rather than thinking 'with' the other. Smith has acknowledged that such an 
objection is found in psychological positions on empathy. According to Smith, 
Davis (9) has viewed CE and EE as 'two distinctly separate' capacities 
[my italics]. Strayer (1987) has rejected the view that there are two kinds 
of empathy and some theorists have suggested that it is helpful to 
distinguish between empathy and pure emotional contagion ( 4). 16 
Viewing empathy as not an aU-or-nothing phenomenon might be seen as the first 
sign that empathy has a role in enlarged mentality. 
To refer back to Zahavi, he quickly cautions us that the position he is advocating 
is not behaviourism because this view does not reduce mental states to behaviour, i.e., 
mental states are identical to, and nothing but, physical behaviour. This view still 
endorses the private feel of these emotions, but does not claim that they are completely 
private either. As Wittgenstein observed, "My thoughts are not hidden from [the other], 
but are just open to him in a different way than they are to me" ( qtd. in Zahavi 153). This 
other way is non-primordially, which we have discussed earlier in the section on Edith 
Stein. 
Since this aspect is of the transposition of one's perspective to that of the other's 
perspective, I suggest that a metaphor that can aid in explaining this aspect of empathy is 
16 I would like to draw attention to Smith's reference to empathy as a 'capacity'. This will be important 
later when I describe later aspects of empathy. 
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the way we involve ourselves in literature. For example, the way in which we empathize 
with a fictional character while reading a novel. According to Mensch, when one 
empathizes with a fictional character one is faced with the obvious philosophical problem 
of how one conceives of the relation between the 'real' subject and the 'fictional' subject. 
As Mensch states, 
If we ask where this character "is", we cannot say that she is in the letters, 
words, or pages of the novel. Neither can we say, since in many cases the 
author is deceased, that she necessarily is in the author's mind. Is she, 
then, in the mind of the reader? Not in any natural scientific sense. The 
character is not "in" us- i.e., in our brain -like an object in a box. Rather, 
she is present insofar as we are "in" her, that is, insofar as we 
imaginatively take up her character, letter ourselves be shaped by her 
environment (12). 
Mensch goes on to say that this imaginative transposition of position is 
characteristic ofthis aspect of empathy; it occurs with 'imaginative' characters as well as 
'real' subjects. Also, according to Mensch, when we position ourselves in the other's 
place, we do not replace her or him. Rather, we experience with the other. According to 
Stein, "To project oneself into another means to carry out his experience with [my italics] 
him as we have described it" (20). Stein further states that 
... my hand is moved (not in reality but 'as if) to the place of the foreign 
one. It is moved into it and occupies its position and attitude, now feeling 
its sensations, though not primordially and not as being its own ... the 
foreign hand is continually perceived as belonging to the foreign body so 
that the empathized sensations are continually brought into relief as 
foreign in contrast with our own sensations (54). 
Mensch calls this experiencing with the other doubling. 
As I imaginatively enter into the life of the character in the novel, my own 
subjectivity undergoes a doubling. In this, the novel represents the subject 
to itself as another by providing him with an alternate environment. In 
other words, the subject's transparency is such that it can undergo a 
double shaping ... The same thing can happen when another person is 
actually present. Genuine empathy, in taking up the other's standpoint, 
41 
enters into the other's environment. As such, it disrupts self-presence. It 
makes it dual by including the other (43). 
Therefore, we see my transposition into the position of the other as a doubling of 
myself with the other. It is here that Mensch stresses the connection between embodiment 
and empathy in terms of selfhood. 
Selfhood .. .is the function of the embodiment I imaginatively share in 
taking up the other's standpoint. The sense a "self" has here can be 
expressed by answering the question: Where is Shingo [the fictional 
character]? ... Shingo ... is where I am as I read the novel. Reading it, I take 
up his character, imaginatively becoming it. Shingo is in the selfhood I 
assume in placing myself in his environment. My selfhood does ... undergo 
a certain doubling .... This doubling of selfhood is implicit in all empathy, 
in all humanistic understanding. Ontologically, it follows from the notion 
that being is where it is at work as living flesh. My body is both my first 
situating environment and that through which my surrounding world 
works on me (44). 
To say that we experience 'with' the other seems to be similar to Benhabib's and 
Arendt's claim that their symmetrical reciprocity is not empathy; however, as I will 
demonstrate this experience 'with' the other precisely implies empathy. 
My account of transposition differs from Benhabib's symmetrical reciprocity 
when I diverge from Thompson's account of transposition. Thompson's account of 
transposition, as well as Benhabib's symmetrical reciprocity, could imply that in the 
aspect of transposition there is a necessary reversal of empathy. According to Thompson, 
Described phenomenologically: I am here and I imagine going there and 
being at the place where you are right now. Conversely, you are here (the 
there where I imagine being) and you imagine you are going there, to the 
place where I am (my here). Through this imagined movement and spatial 
transposition, we are able to exchange our mental perspectives, our 
thoughts and feelings" ("Human Experience" 266). 
The problem I am pointing to is the 'exchange' of positions. Of course, reversal is 
possible, and as I will argue, perhaps necessary for a full account of empathy; however, if 
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one adheres to the idea that empathy is not an aU-or-nothing phenomenon, then we have 
to allow for the fact that one party may position himself in the perspective of the other 
without the other positioning herself in his perspective. For example, if I empathize with 
a fictional character, the fictional character does not empathize with me precisely because 
the character is fictional; therefore, there is no reversal of perspectives in this situation. 
To insist that every instance of empathy requires a reversal of positions would, in my 
opinion, violate the not aU-or-nothing requirement. Rather, in order to make sense of how 
we should conceptualize the transposition of perspectives I suggest we adopt Judy Miles' 
interpretation of Stein's notion of empathy as that of 'projection'. 
In one of her positive arguments for interpreting empathy as projection, Miles 
states (consistently with Mensch's description of empathizing with a fictional character), 
I take the kind of 'projecting' which empathy involves to be very much 
like the experience an actress has when "putting herself in character." She 
contemplates the character she is about to portray and imagines what it 
would be like to be that person. She imagines herself in the other's place. 
This is necessary to being able to portray a role convincingly and one's 
skill at doing this is what distinguishes good acting from bad (122). 
If we take this aspect of empathy as 'projection', then we avoid the problem of 
assuming that in every instance of empathy there is an automatic reversibility of 
positions. Although my position may resemble Young's objection that reversibility is 
impossible, unlike Young I do not insist that reversibility is impossible. In the last chapter 
of this thesis I will address how my position is similar to Young's position but that it does 
not imply her asymmetrical reciprocity. 
2.9 Reiterated Empathy 
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The next aspect of empathy is not only the recognition that you are an other for 
me, but also the understanding that I am an other for you. According to Thompson, 
In other words, the imaginary transposition in this kind of empathy 
involves the possibility of seeing myself from your perspective, that is, as 
you empathetically experience me ... The upshot is that each of us 
participates in an intersubjective viewpoint that transcends our own first-
person singular perspectives ("Human Experience" 266-7). 
This aspect of empathy transcends our first-person perspective by seeing myself 
from your perspective. Through this aspect we essentially have a plurality of 
perspectives: our first-person perspective, and the representations of other's perspectives. 
Thompson refers to this aspect of empathy as 'reiterated empathy' and further states that 
In reiterated empathy, I see myself from your perspective. Stated more 
precisely, I empathetically grasp your empathetic experience of me. As a 
result, I acquire a view of myself not simply as a physical thing, but as a 
physical-thing-empathetically-grasped-by-you-as-a-living-being. In other 
words, I do not merely experience myself as a sentient being 'from 
within', nor grasp myself as also a physical thing in the world; I 
experience myself as recognizably sentient 'from without', that is, from 
your perspective, the perspective of another. In this way, one's sense of 
self-identity, even at the most fundamental levels of embodied agency, is 
inseparable from recognition by another, and from the ability to grasp that 
recognition empathetically ("Consciousness" 19-20). 
Reiterated empathy, then, is very similar to Merleau-Ponty's description of self 
touch. In self touch, I am both the object and subject of this sensation and in reiterated 
empathy, not only am I aware that you are an other for me, but that I recognize that I am 
an other for you. 
Thompson is borrowing the term 'reiterated empathy' from Edith Stein. 
According to Stein, 
In "reiterated empathy" I again interpret this physical body as a living 
body, and so it is that I first am given to myself as a psycho-physical 
individual in the full sense ... But I cannot look at myself freely as at 
another physical body. If in a childhood memory or fancy I see myself in 
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the branch of a tree or on the shore of the Bosporus, I see myself as 
another or as another sees me. This makes empathy possible for me (58-
59). 
Also, in this third aspect of empathy, not only do I transpose myself into the place 
of the other and experience her content, but I become aware of a specific content, namely, 
her perception of me. To tie this back to Merleau-Ponty's rejection of an interpretation of 
Husserl, I am not a pure transcendental Ego that constitutes meaning and consequently 
the world; rather, I am an embodied subject who is a subject as well as an object ofthe 
world that is among other subjects in the same situation. 
Next, I will describe the last aspect of empathy, namely, empathy's relation to 
ethics. 
2.10 Empathy & Ethics 
There must be an emotional concern for the other if we are to have an ethical 
theory17• However, Thompson cautions us that this aspect of empathy is not to be 
identified as the feeling concern for the other, such as sympathy, love, or compassion, but 
" ... instead as the underlying capacity [my italics] to have such other-directed and other-
regarding feelings of concern" ("Human Experience" 268). This aspect of empathy must 
be understood as the ability or the capability of having these feelings of concern for the 
other because the levels we have discussed throughout this paper are understood as 
capacities or capabilities for performing their respective actions empathetically. To 
'identify' empathy at this aspect with the feeling seems to confuse the potentiality for the 
act with the act. 
17 This is consistent and almost necessary given the discussion ofDamasio's neuropsychological discovery 
of the emotion's role in rationality. 
45 
This aspect is important to an ethical theory because it puts emphasis on the 
concern and respect for the other. Since the emphasis is on the genuine concern and 
respect for the other, Thompson then questions moral theories that privilege reason over 
feeling 18 ("Human Experience" 269). For example, Kant's Categorical Imperative is 
supposed to be seen as purely rational. We are to use the Categorical Imperative, which 
states that we are to act only in accord with policies, or maxims, which can be applied 
universally among all subjects, to discover what is morally permissible and our 'duty'. 
Therefore, for Kant, "Duty is the necessity of an action done out of respect for the law" 
(Morals 13). The sentiment of acting out of duty and not in accordance with feeling is 
expressed best by Kant's example of someone who is distressed but must help his friend: 
Suppose then the mind of this friend of mankind to be clouded over with 
his own sorrow so that all sympathy with the lot of others is extinguished, 
and suppose him still to have the power to benefit others in distress, even 
though he is not touched by their trouble because he is sufficiently 
absorbed with his own; and now suppose that, even though no inclination 
moves him any longer, he nevertheless tears himself from his deadly 
insensibility and performs the action without any inclination at all, but 
solely from duty - then for the first time his action has genuine moral 
worth" (Morals 11 ). 
For Kant, the subject's 'feelings' do not aid him in his decision to act morally; 
rather, for Kant, these 'feelings' (as he sees them) may impede this person to act morally 
by tempting the subject to act selfishly. To act selfishly violates the Categorical 
Imperative for it wills something that is not to be universalized. Therefore, for Kant, 
these feelings should not play a role in moral action. 
However, Thompson questions ethical theories such as Kant's that prioritize 
rationality over moral feelings. In fact, Thompson goes on to say that emotions, which 
18 Again, this is further supported by the research of Antonio Damasio that was discussed at the beginning 
of this chapter who argues that our rationality depends upon emotions, which is characteristic of the 
emotional marker hypothesis. 
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Kant says may impede moral action, are in fact necessary for moral action. As Frans de 
Waal observes, "Aid to others in need would never be internalized as a duty without the 
fellow-feeling that drives people to take an interest in one another. Moral sentiments 
came first; moral principles second'" (qtd. in Thompson "Human Experience" 269). In 
other words, the incentive for moral principles must be grounded in moral feelings 
because even in Kant's theory we need to have an emotional tie to the Categorical 
Imperative for us to abide by it throughout our lives. Again, to quote Thompson, 
Empathy is the basic cognitive and emotional capacity underlying all the 
moral sentiments and emotions we can have for another. The point here is 
not that empathy exhausts the domain for moral and ethical experience, for 
clearly it does not. The point is that empathy provides the source of that 
domain and the entry point into it, because empathy is what enables us to 
develop concern and respect for others as persons ("Human Experience" 
269). 
This observation is supported by the section on emotions described earlier. Recall, 
that there are at least two functions of the emotions; to assign and to recognize value 
which in tum leads to moral sentiments. Therefore, moral sentiments have to be in place 
first otherwise we would find ourselves in the same 'cold-bloodedness' of Elliot's 
situation. Kant may object by saying that emotions may impede the fulfillment our duty, 
we nevertheless must assign a moral sentiment on duty in order to abide by said duty. 
2.11 Chapter Summary 
In this section of the thesis, I have tried to emphasize how our subjectivity is 
understood, namely, through embodiment, and how others are also embodied in a 
physical and social environment. The remainder of this section elucidated the way in 
which we as embodied subjects, understand the other, i.e., through empathy. Empathy, as 
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conceived of in this paper, is not to be seen as an ali-or-nothing phenomenon; it is the 
understanding of the other's experiential content with the other. Therefore, the self and 
the other double our selfhood. Here our very selfhood is a constitution of self and other, 
which amplifies the impact others have on our own consciousness. 
In the last section of this thesis, I wish to return to the claims made by Arendt, 
Benhabib and Young regarding enlarged mentality and empathy. My objective is to 
demonstrate how their concepts rely upon a notion of embodiment and to demonstrate 
through transposition that these concepts rely upon the notion of empathy. 
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Chapter Three 
3.1 Objective 
In this chapter, I demonstrate that Arendtian concepts-- 'going visiting', sensus 
communis, impartiality, enlarged mentality, and the actor/spectator-- rely upon 
embodiment phenomenology and thus, upon the form of empathy described in the 
previous chapter. In order to make this argument I will examine not only Arendt's claims, 
but also those of Arendtian philosophers such as Seyla Benhabib and Lisa Disch. 
I will begin by examining Benhabib's potential response to Young's objections to 
symmetrical reciprocity (the theory that claims that the positions of others are reversible). 
I believe that Benhabib would respond by attacking Young's conception of the self and 
from here, I will argue that Benhabib's positive account of self relies upon embodiment 
phenomenology. In this section, I will present Benhabib's view of the 'generalized' and 
the 'concrete' other in order to clarify a possible misinterpretation on Young's behalf. I 
will also examine how Lisa Disch's concept of situated impartiality, which she derives 
from Arendt's work on Archimedean impartiality, specifically implies embodied 
phenomenology. 
3.2 Generalized & Concrete Other 
According to Benhabib, there are two important conceptions of self/other 
relationships within moral philosophy19• Benhabib names the first conception the 
'generalized' and the second the 'concrete' other. Benhabib also informs us that "In 
19 In her book, Situating the Self, Benhabib describes " ... two conceptions of self-other relations that 
delineate both moral perspectives and interactional structures. I shall name the first the standpoint of the 
'generalized' and the second that ofthe 'concrete' other" (158). 
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contemporary moral theory these two conceptions are viewed as incompatible, even 
antagonistic" (158). She goes on further to say that 
These two perspectives reflect the dichotomies and splits of early modem 
moral and political theory between autonomy and nurturance, 
independence and bonding, the public and the domestic, and more 
broadly, between justice and the good life. The content of the generalized 
as well as the concrete other is shaped by this dichotomous 
characterization, which we have inherited from the modem tradition (158). 
Benhabib characterizes the generalized other as follows: 
The standpoint of the generalized other requires us to view each and every 
individual as a rational being entitled to the same rights and duties we 
would want to ascribe to ourselves. In assuming the standpoint, we 
abstract from the individuality and concrete identity of the other. We 
assume that the other, like ourselves, is a being who has concrete needs, 
desires, and affects, but that what constitutes his or her moral dignity is 
not what differentiates us from each other, but rather what we, as speaking 
and acting rational agents, have in common (159)20• 
On the other hand, the concrete other is characterized as follows: 
The standpoint of the concrete other ... requires us to view each and every 
rational being as an individual with a concrete history, identity and 
affective-emotional constitution. In assuming this standpoint, we abstract 
from what constitutes our commonality, and focus on individuality. We 
seek to comprehend the needs of the other, his or her motivations, what 
s/he searches for, and what s/he desires ... Our differences in this case 
complement rather than exclude one another (Benhabib 159). 
Nevertheless, one may ask, how is Benhabib's notion of the concrete other an 
answer to Young's objections to symmetrical reciprocity? I will take this concept of the 
concrete other and answer each objection in tum in such a way as I believe Benhabib 
would answer these objections herself. 
20 Benhabib also points out that she has borrowed the term 'generalized' other from George Herbert Mead 
but that her definition is different than his. For Mead characterizes the generalized other as "The organized 
community or social group which gives the individual his unity of self may be called the 'generalized 
other'. The attitude ofthe generalized other is the attitude ofthe whole community" (qtd. in Benhabib 
174n22). 
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Recall that Young has three major objections to Benhabib's notion of symmetrical 
reciprocity. Briefly stated, Young's first objection is that this idea of symmetry obscures 
the difference and particularity of the other's position. Symmetry suggests that people are 
able to understand one another's perspectives because we are all similar; we are able to 
see ourselves "reflected in the other people and find that they see themselves reflected in 
us" (Young 44). In fact, Young argues we each have our different life-stories, or 
narratives, emotional habits, and so on, that make our positions irreversible ( 45). 
Young's first objection resembles Thomas Nagel's position in his famous article 
"What is it Like to Be a Bat?'' Nagel argues against the materialist position that holds that 
once we have comprehensive scientific knowledge about our physical processes, we will 
know all there is to know about our mental states. As the title of Nagel's paper suggests, 
we can know everything about a bat's physiology but we can never know what it is like 
to be a bat. It is this conscious experience of what it is like to be something that is the 
hard problem of consciousness?1 This qualitative 'feel' can never be captured from a 
third-person perspective but can only be known through a first-person perspective. Nagel 
thus argues for the first person perspective. Materialists try to reduce the hard problem to 
a material process in order to eliminate the problem finally. However, Nagel objects to 
this position and points out that all of the scientific knowledge of neuroscience cannot 
explain the felt experience of the subject whose experiences it is. 
I believe Benhabib would respond to Young by saying that the concept of the 
other that Young is employing is precisely that of the 'generalized' other; not the 
concrete other. Recall Benhabib's objection to the generalized other and her insistence 
21 The 'hard problem of consciousness' has been the center of debate in the philosophy of mind in the past 
decade. For more information on the 'hard problem of consciousness' see David Chalmers The Conscious 
Mind. 
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that the concrete other should be our model of the other. Young's first objection is 
dissolved. Young focuses solely on the generalized other rather than looking at 
Benhabib's elaborate definition of the concrete other. Once we note that the concrete 
other is the centre of Benhabib' s notion of symmetrical reciprocity, Young's objection is 
dissolved because Young is objecting to a notion of the generalized other, not the 
concrete other. 
In addition, Young seems to imply that the self and the other are two distinct and 
different entities; however, Arendt would object to this claim for she says that there is a 
difference between 'otherness' and 'distinctness'. 
Human distinctness is not the same as otherness ... Otherness, it is true, is 
an important aspect of plurality, the reason why all our definitions and 
distinctions, why we are unable to say what anything is without 
distinguishing it from something else. Otherness in its most abstract form 
is found only in the sheer multiplication of inorganic objects, whereas all 
organic life already shows variations and distinctions, even between 
specimens of the same species. But only man can express this distinction 
and distinguish himself, and only he can communicate himself and not 
merely something- thirst or hunger, affection or hostility or fear. In man, 
otherness, which he shares with everything that is, and distinctness, which 
he shares with everything else alive, becomes uniqueness, and human 
plurality is the paradoxical plurality of unique beings. Speech and action 
reveal this unique distinctness. Through them, men distinguish themselves 
instead of being merely distinct; they are the modes in which human 
beings appear to each other, not indeed as physical objects, but qua men 
(Human Condition 176). 
Disch also notes this difference in Arendt. I believe Disch would agree with 
Nagel's insistence upon the irreducibility of conscious experience, but she also argues 
that "Arendt defends the possibility of visiting on the premise that human differences are 
irreducible to one another but are not incommensurable" (Disch 164). Where Young 
insists that each individual is different, she seems to advocate that the differences are 
incommensurable. Although, Young does say that the way we come to understand 
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"across difference" is by 'listening' to the other. However, this is more complicated than 
Young anticipates. There is a problem with Young's notion of intersubjectivity, which 
resembles the objection raised against Cartesian dualism: how is it possible that two 
radically different and distinct individuals come to understand one another by 'listening' 
to one another? Instead, communicability must be understood through enlarged mentality. 
As Arendt says, "Communicability obviously depends upon the enlarged mentality; one 
can communicate only if one is able to think from the other person's standpoint; 
otherwise one will never meet him, never speak in such a way that he understands" 
(Lectures 74). 
Young's second objection is that it is ontologically impossible for people in one 
social position to adopt the perspective of those in another social position. To recognize 
the other as other and self as self means: " ... she is an 'I' to herself as I am an 'I' to 
myself and that I am an 'other' to her just as she is an 'other' to me (Young 46). 
However, according to Young, this is not a symmetrical relationship (which is 
Benhabib's position) rather, "This relation of self and other is asymmetrical and 
irreversible, even though it is reciprocal. The reciprocal recognition ... cannot entail a 
reversibility of perspectives" (Young 46-47). Here Young is reiterating the Levinasian 
concern of collapsing the self and other (Levinas Ethics and Totality). 
Young's second objection resembles Disch's objection against a theory of 
empathy because, according to Disch, empathy is a form of assimilation. Again for 
Disch, one of the essential elements in Arendt's philosophy is 'going visiting', but, 
'going visiting' is not empathy. As Disch describes, 
Visiting is contrary to parochialism, which means simply to stay at home, 
contrary to 'accidental' tourism, which means to ensure that you will have 
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all the comforts of home even as you travel, and contrary to 
assimilationism, which means forcibly to make yourself at home in a place 
that is not your home by appropriating its customs. To visit, in other 
words, you must travel to a new location, leave behind what is familiar, 
and resist the temptation to make yourself at home where you are not. 
Both the tourist and the assimilationist erase plurality (159). 
However, if we return to Benhabib's concept ofthe concrete other, the otherness 
of the other is constantly sustained; the concrete other never collapses into the self, as 
Benhabib says is characteristic of the generalized other. For according to Benhabib, under 
the generalized other, " ... the other as different from the self disappears" (161). Rod 
Michalko' s discussion of George Herbert Mead echoes this point: 
... the 'I' is not destroyed through the formation of a 'we'. Instead, the two 
co-exist in the social world expressed in the interminable dialectic of 
estrangement and familiarity. We become 'reconciled' to the world, but 
we will always be to some degree estranged from it as well, "to the extent 
of [our] distinct uniqueness" ( 1 06). 
This sentiment is perfectly consistent with Benhabib's notion of the concrete 
other, for it sustains the self/other distinction through particularity and individuality 
without collapsing the self and other. Further, recall Stein's and Mensch's insistence that 
in empathy, we do not experience as the other; rather, we experience with the other. 
Finally, taking the perspective of the other, for Young, can have "politically 
undesirable consequences" (Young 44). Young points out that when people try to put 
themselves in the position of others, "they often put themselves, with their own particular 
experiences and privileges," in the positions of the person in which they are trying to 
represent in this enlarged mentality (48). It is here I believe that Benhabib would object 
to Young's interpretation of Arendt's concept of 'enlarged mentality' and say that 
Young's interpretation seems to imply what Arendt, and Benhabib, characterize as 
empathy. According to Benhabib, 
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... Arendt also noted the capacity for exercising an 'enlarged mentality', 
the ability to take the standpoint of the other into account is not empathy 
although it is related to it. Empathy means the capacity to "feel with, to 
feel together." Yet precisely very empathetic individuals may also be the 
ones lacking an 'enlarged mentality', for their empathetic nature may 
make it difficult for them to draw the boundaries between self and other 
such that the standpoint of the 'concrete other' can emerge (168). 
It is also at this point where I depart from Benhabib. I will argue now that it is 
precisely through embodiment phenomenology that the 'concrete other' can emerge. 
3.3 Benhabib & Embodiment 
Benhabib warns us that her arguments for the distinction, and the preference of, 
the concrete other over the generalized other is not prescriptive: 
This distinction between the 'generalized' and the 'concrete' other ... is not 
a prescriptive but a critical one. My goal is not to prescribe a moral or 
political theory consonant with the standpoint of the concrete other ... my 
purpose is to develop a universalistic moral theory that defines the 'moral 
point of view' in light of the reversibility of perspectives and an 'enlarged 
mentality'. Such a moral theory allows us to recognize the dignity of the 
generalized other through an acknowledgement of the moral identity of the 
concrete other (164). 
However, if we examine the language ofBenhabib's argument we discover that 
her argument for the concrete other is a negative one. Benhabib arrives at the concrete 
other through arguments against the generalized other. 
I conclude that a definition of the self that is restricted to the standpoint of 
the generalized other becomes incoherent and cannot individuate among 
selves. Without assuming the standpoint of the concrete other, no coherent 
universalizability test can be carried out, for we lack the necessary 
epistemic information to judge my moral situation to be 'like' or 'unlike' 
yours (163-164). 
Although Benhabib's negative argument is valid, it is not as strong as a positive 
argument. I am not arguing against Benhabib's notion of the concrete other; rather I 
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believe the foundation she looks for is found in the previous chapter of this thesis. The 
notion of selfhood that Benhabib employs resembles the notion of selfhood I have 
described at length in the second chapter, namely, selfhood as embodiment. Below 
Benhabib is describing her account of human identity, but if we examine what follows, 
we shall see that her account of identity resembles a theory of embodiment. 
Identity does not refer to my potential for choice alone, but to the actuality 
of my choices, namely to how I, as a finite, concrete, embodied [my 
italics] individual, shape and fashion the circumstances of my birth and 
family, linguistic, cultural, and gender identity into a coherent narrative 
that stands as my life's story (161-162). 
In addition, if we compare Benhabib's concept of the concrete other to Stein's 
description of the zero point of orientation, we can conclude that they are completely 
compatible with one another. Recall the discussion of the zero point of orientation: " ... I 
relate my body and everything outside of it. Whatever refers to the "I" is given as at no 
distance from the zero point is also given at a distance from the "I" ... Thus the living 
body as a whole is at the zero point while all physical bodies are outside of it" (Stein 
XV). 
The zero point of orientation resembles Benhabib' s notion of the concrete other 
insofar as the zero point of orientation must be seen as a foundation or basis for the 
notion of the concrete other. Benhabib's characterization of the concrete other is that of a 
subject who has a concrete history, narrative, and so on. This is demonstrated in the 
discussion of the zero point of orientation. The basis of each individual concrete other 
can be seen as each individual having his or her own respective center for primordial 
experience. If we posit the other's concrete primordial experience, then this notion has a 
theory of embodiment at its foundation. 
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It is central to note the importance of embodiment to a theory of the concrete 
other. As I will argue, the concrete other is grounded by embodiment phenomenology. 
Also, as demonstrated in the second chapter, one key factor in an embodiment theory of 
intersubjectivity is empathy22• 
I will now tum to the next concept, and perhaps the most important concept in 
Arendt's philosophy, impartiality, and argue that it depends upon an embodied 
phenomenology. 
First, recall how important impartiality is for Arendt. In a political context, it is 
essential to have impartiality, especially within a multicultural context. The way in which 
Arendt wants to achieve impartiality is to take the standpoint of the spectator and not the 
actor. Again, recall that Arendt describes the spectator as: 
... the spectator occupies a position that enables him to see the whole; the 
actor, because he is part of the play, must enact his part- he is partial by 
definition. The spectator is impartial by definition - no part is assigned to 
him. Hence, withdrawal from direct involvement to a standpoint outside 
the game is a condition sine qua non of all judgment (Lectures 55). 
It is also important to note that Arendt is not talking about a disembodied 
spectator, which Lisa Disch refers to as possessing Archimedean impartiality?3 Instead, 
Disch argues that Arendt's spectator does not search for Archimedean impartiality, but 
rather, a situated impartiality. 
3.4 Lisa Disch, Situated Impartiality & Embodiment 
22 Benhabib, however, may object to this assertion because I am not using the term 'empathy' in the same 
manner as she uses the term. This should not, however, be seen as an objection; rather, it should be seen as 
approval ofthe thesis project as a whole. I am trying to provide Arendt, Benhabib, Young, and other 
political philosophers, a different definition of empathy that could be useful especially if one wants to use 
Arendt's theory of enlarged mentality and Benhabib's concrete other. 
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Disch characterizes Arendt's work as a contrast to Archimedean impartiality. 
According to Disch, 
Arendt's attack on Archimedean thinking differs from that of post-
structuralist and feminist critical theorists in an important way. She argues 
that the problem with the Archimedean model is not its claim that critique 
should be impartial but its assumption that impartiality entails an absolute 
withdrawal from worldly interest (12). 
In other words, the Archimedean model that Disch says Arendt is arguing against 
is one that completely removes oneself from the situation as though it were removed from 
all bias. In short, Disch describes the Archimedean model as a model that " ... consists in 
conceiving of power as leverage and assuming that abstract impartiality is requisite to 
knowledge" ( 22). Disch wants to distance herself from any model that wants to adopt a 
purely objectivist, or disembodied perspective that insists on having a purely objective 
position in order to make judgments. The model that Disch says is present in Arendt's 
philosophy is what Disch has named 'situated impartiality'. 
I suggest the paradox 'situated impartiality' to name the elusive critical 
position that is achieved by visiting. Arendt herself does not use the term. 
Rather, I discern it from the various places where she describes the 
enlarged mentality as 'being and thinking' as yourself from a position in 
which you are not at home. Where Arendt presents the visiting metaphor 
as an insight that she learned from Kant, 'situated impartiality' presents it 
as a conceptual innovation and a departure from his text. It should be 
clear ... that this is not a term I am forcing onto Arendt but one that 
emerged out of my close reading ofher work (161-162). 
Disch goes on further to describe situated impartiality as: 
... a critical decision that is not justified with reference to an abstract 
standard of right by visiting a plurality of diverging public standpoints. 
Though arriving at a situated impartial judgment is a public and collective 
process, it does not involve the absolute or definitive resolution of conflict 
either by transcending it or by subsuming it within an all-encompassing 
solution (162). 
58 
Disch describes Arendt's objection to an Archimedean model by arguing that the 
Archimedean position is consistent with a model that can 'jump outside of time', which 
undermines Arendt's conception of storytelling and enlarged mentality as a whole. 
But, consistent with her critique of Archimedean thinking, she rejects the 
fantasy of jumping outside of time. Arendt observes that there would be 
no history to think about if man jumped outside of time, because without 
the insertion into time of beings whose life spans are limited and 
nonrenewable, "there would be no difference between past and future, but 
only everlasting change." Just as there can be no space without human 
plurality, there can be no time without human natality (166). 
This is also similar to Merleau-Ponty's objection to empiricism, which according 
to Merleau-Ponty tries to examine consciousness in terms of objective language. This is 
why Merleau-Ponty holds that philosophy is not a science. 
Philosophy is not a science, because science believes it can soar over its 
object and hold the correlation of knowledge with being as established, 
whereas philosophy is the set of questions wherein he who questions is 
himself implicated by the question (Visible 27). 
For Merleau-Ponty, if we are able to 'soar over' our object of study, e.g., our 
body, then there could be no self-reference because we would be detached from our 
body?4 To refer to the self, means to refer to our body. This is consistent with the claims 
of establishing the zero point of orientation as we have seen in Stein, and the concrete 
other as we have seen in Benhabib. For Merleau-Ponty, the only way we are able to have 
self-reference is if we are embodied subjects. In addition, we, as human beings, are both 
subject and object. If we were just pure objects, as is the position of empiricism 
according to Merleau-Ponty, then it would be not possible for either the left or the right 
hand to sense each other at all. To experience sensation requires a subject; a pure object 
24 Recall my exposition ofMerleau-Ponty's discussion of self-touch in the second chapter: for Merleau-
Ponty, self-touch is the essential in understanding our subjectivity because self-touch is characteristic of our 
embodied nature. 
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entails no subject at all. If the body is a pure object, then there would be no perceiver. In 
language suitable to Merleau-Ponty, the scientist has an explanation for everything except 
for the scientist him or herself. 25 
3.5 Enlarged Mentality and Empathy 
The last Arendtian concept I will discuss is the conception of enlarged mentality 
itself. I will demonstrate how enlarged mentality resembles the theory of empathy I have 
argued for throughout this thesis. First, there is a remarkable similarity between Arendt's 
description of enlarged mentality (and of the method she prescribes to gain such an 
enlarged mentality) and the elaborate definition of empathy. Arendt says that enlarged 
mentality is accomplished by " .... comparing our judgment with the possible rather than 
the actual judgments of others, and by putting ourselves in the place of any other man." 
The faculty that makes this possible is called imagination" (Lectures 43). Therefore, 
enlarged mentality is the collection of standpoints we imaginatively represent to 
ourselves whenever we make a judgment in order to escape the prejudices of the actor in 
order to reach the perspective or, using Arendt's language, the standpoint of the spectator. 
However, if we recall Stein's position on empathy, we notice that she too uses the same 
language, arguing that empathy is made possible by imaginatively representing the 
viewpoint of the other to oneself. 
Also, stating one can find similarities of the theory of empathy I have proposed 
and enlarged mentality is consistent with James Mensch's elaboration of the experience 
of empathy and transposition. Mensch would argue against Disch's insistence that 
empathy is an assimilationist theory because according to Mensch, when we position 
25 I must thank my professor, James Mensch, for this observation. 
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ourselves in the other's place, we do not replace them; rather, we experience with the 
other. This is consistent with both Stein who says, "To project oneself into another means 
to carry out his experience with [my italics] him as we have described it" (20), and 
Disch's description of 'going visiting'. 
Again, another of Arendt's concepts implies a theory of embodied subjectivity, 
and as we have established in the second chapter, empathy is crucial in a theory of 
embodiment. Therefore, given the more elaborate definition of empathy I have described, 
I believe that Arendt would subscribe to this theory of empathy. The definition of 
empathy I have described acts as a grounding for her theory of enlarged mentality 
because the majority of her concepts are based upon a theory of embodiment. 
3.6 Conclusion 
The objective ofthis chapter has been to demonstrate how Arendtian concepts 
rely upon embodiment phenomenology. Through the careful exposition ofBenhabib's 
concept ofthe generalized other and the concrete other, I have addressed Young's three 
objections, while demonstrating that the 'concrete' other is established through Stein's 
notion of the zero point of orientation. In addition, I have also demonstrated that Arendt's 
notion of impartiality relies upon an embodied subject that is described by Merleau-Ponty 
in The Visible and the Invisible. In the second chapter it was further shown that empathy 
is quintessential to an embodied theory ofintersubjectivity. 
In conclusion, through a careful examination of the foundations of Arendt's key 
concepts of her theory of enlarged mentality-- 'going visiting', sensus communis, 
impartiality, enlarged mentality, and the actor/spectator-- I have demonstrated that 
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enlarged mentality is best understood as reliant upon the type of empathy described in the 
second chapter. What has been shown is not that Arendt is incorrect in insisting that 
enlarged mentality is not a form of empathy. Rather, I have argued that Arendt's theory 
of enlarged mentality necessarily entails the variant of empathy based on embodiment 
phenomenology outlined above. 
I believe that this project will have far reaching implications. First, and foremost, 
it opens up the possibility for new research in interpreting and utilizing Arendt's texts as 
it applies to contemporary social and political philosophy. Second, the findings of this 
project can influence other ethical theories to examine the phenomenological 
underpinnings of their respective theories. This will in tum lead to the third implication 
of this paper, namely it aids in relating research in the philosophy of mind and ethics in 
order to provide a more comprehensive theory of human nature. 
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